In this paper, we propose a new security protocol for proxy signature by a hierarchy of proxy signers. In this protocol, the original signer delegates his/her signing capability to a predefined hierarchy of proxy signers. Given the documents of a security class to be signed by the original signer, our scheme suggests a protocol for the hierarchy of proxy signers to sign the document on behalf of the original signer. The concept of hierarchical access control limits the number of people who could sign the document to the people who have the required security clearances. User in a security class requires two secret keys: one which identifies his/her security clearance, and that can also be derived by a user of upper level security clearance and second is his/her private key which identifies him/her as a proxy signer for the signature generation. We show that our scheme is efficient in terms of computational complexity as compared to the existing related proxy signature schemes based on the hierarchical access control. Our scheme also supports addition and deletion of security classes in the hierarchy. We show through security analysis that our scheme is secure against possible attacks. Furthermore, through the formal security analysis using the AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool we show that our scheme is also secure against passive and active attacks.
Introduction
A digital signature can help to provide the integrity and authenticity of a message, such as a document, file, etc. This concept cannot however be applied directly to a situation where the original signer delegates his/her signing capability to a proxy signer to sign the documents on behalf of himself/herself. Mambo et al. (1996) introduced the concept of proxy signature. In a proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates his/her signing capability to a proxy signer. The proxy signer signs the documents on behalf of original signer. A verifier can then verify that the document is signed by a proxy signer. Further, the verifier can also verify its validity and that the proxy signer has the capability to do so. More precisely, in a proxy signature scheme there is an original signer who delegates his/her signing capability to a proxy signer by issuing a proxy key. The proxy signer then signs a message on behalf of the original signer. From the proxy signature signed by a proxy signer using the proxy key, any verifier can check the original signer's digital delegation as well as the proxy signer's digital signature. Several proxy signature schemes have been proposed in the literature (Mambo et al., 1996; Shao, 2003; Tan et al., 2002) . A survey on proxy signatures can be found in Das et al. (2009) .
Hierarchical access control is an interesting area of research in the field of cryptography. In such a system, there is a predefined hierarchy which gives the information of the security clearance of a user belonging to a particular security class. This hierarchy can be represented by a partially ordered set (poset). A hierarchy is constructed by dividing the users into a number n of disjoint security classes, say SC 1 , SC 2 , . . . , SC n which are partially ordered with a binary relation 6 defined on the set U = {SC 1 , SC 2 , . . . , SC n }. In such a set, SC i 6 SC j implies that SC j has the higher security clearance than that for SC i , and the documents accessed by SC i can also be accessed by SC j , but the reverse is not allowed. Consider an example of user hierarchy shown in Fig. 1 . In this figure, a hierarchy is constructed by a set of five disjoint security classes SC 1 , SC 2 ,SC 3 , SC 4 , and SC 5 . SC 1 has the highest security clearance level. The security classes SC 2 , SC 4 , and SC 5 at the bottom level contain the lowest security clearances. SC 1 can access the secret information possessed by SC 2 , SC 3 , SC 4 and SC 5 . SC 3 can again access to the secret information held by SC 4 and SC 5 . Akl and Taylor (1983) proposed the first-ever hierarchical access control based key assignment scheme. Chung et al. (2008) proposed a key management and derivation scheme based on the elliptic curve cryptosystem. In their approach, the secret key of each security class can be determined by a trusted centralized authority. Their scheme has the ability to solve the dynamic key management efficiently and flexibly. However, it is recently shown in Das et al. (2012) that their scheme is vulnerable to exterior root finding attack in which an attacker (adversary) who is not a user in any security class in a user hierarchy can derive the secret key of a security class by using the root finding algorithm. Many dynamic access control schemes have been proposed in the literature, some of them are Lin (1997) , Akl and Taylor (1983) , Shen and Chen (2002) , Zhong (2002) , Sandhu (1988) , Srivastava (2007, 2008) , Wu and Wei (2005) , and Odelu et al. (in press, 2012 Odelu et al. (in press, , 2013 .
In this paper, we devise a new proxy signature scheme based on hierarchical access control. The main motivation behind our new approach is as follows. In the absence of an original signer, the signing capability can be delegated to a group/set of users in a user hierarchy wherein the security clearances of those users are predefined. Note that the user hierarchy contains only the security classes for proxy signers, not for any original signers. For example, in an organization some important documents can be singed on behalf of the head of that organization. There is a predefined hierarchy of security clearances among the members of that organization. A document of security clearance containing in the security class SC i can be signed by that security class on behalf of the head of the organization. For example, in Fig. 1 , the documents containing to the security class SC 5 can be singed by either SC 1 or SC 3 or SC 5 . The verifier needs to verify the following two conditions: (i) whether the right person has signed the document and (ii) whether the user has been delegated the signing capability to sign the document.
A widely accepted list of required security requirements for a proxy signature is given below (Das et al., 2009): Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can only have the ability to create a valid signature on behalf of the original signer, whereas the original signer and other third parties cannot create a valid proxy signature. Strong identifiability: Anyone can determine the identity of the proxy signer from the corresponding proxy signature. Strong undeniability: This property tells that once a proxy signer has created a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, he/she cannot deny later the signature creation. Verifiability: This means that the verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement from the proxy signer. Distinguishability: Anyone can distinguish the proxy signatures from the normal signatures. Secrecy: The original signer's private key must not be derived from any information, such as the sharing of the proxy key, proxy signatures, etc. Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the proxy key for any other purpose than it is made for. Giri et al. (2009) introduced the concept of proxy signature based on hierarchical access control. Their scheme contains the hierarchical access control scheme followed by a proxy signature scheme. A trusted central authority is responsible for generating and assigning keys to the users in the hierarchy. Their access control scheme is based on Newton's interpolating polynomials. Further, their scheme is also secure against different attacks.
Our scheme is different from the scheme proposed by Giri et al. In our scheme, we define a set of designated proxy signers in the user hierarchy selected by the original signer. Based on the document pertaining to a particular security level class, the original signer selects a user, called the proxy signer, from that set based on their availability and work load who can sign those documents on behalf of the original signer. In our scheme, the secret key of the proxy signer is embedded into the proxy signature so that any verifier can verify that the right person only has signed the document. We show through analysis and simulation using the AVISPA tool that our scheme is secure against possible attacks. Furthermore, our scheme is also efficient as compared to Giri et al.'s scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some mathematical preliminaries which are needed to describe and analyze our scheme. In this section, we describe briefly the mathematical background on the one-way hash function, the polynomial evaluation over a finite field and the discrete logarithm problem. In Section 3, we introduce our new proxy signature scheme which uses the concept of hierarchical access control policy. In Section 4, we analyze the performance and security for our proposed scheme. In Section 5, we show through simulation that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks. For this purpose, we use the AVISPA tool for formal security analysis in this paper. In Section 6, we compare the performance of our scheme with Giri et al.'s scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we describe briefly the mathematical background on the one-way hash function, the polynomial evaluation over a finite field and the discrete logarithm problem, which are useful for discussing and analyzing our proposed scheme.
Hash functions
A one-way hash function H:{0, 1} * fi {0, 1} n takes an arbitrary-length input x 2 {0, 1} * , and produces a fixed-length (say, n-bits) output H(x) 2 {0, 1} n , called the message digest or hash value. The hash function can be applied to the fingerprint of a file, a message, or other data blocks, and it has the following important attributes (Stallings, 2003) :
(i) The hash function, H can be applied to a data block of all sizes. An example of a one-way hash function is SHA-1 (Secure Hash Standard, 1995), which has the above desired properties (i) to (vi). However, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) does not recommend SHA-1 for top secret documents. Further, in 2011, Manuel showed collision attacks on SHA-1 (Manuel, 2011) . As in Das (2012b,a) one can also use the recently proposed one-way hash function, Quark (Aumasson et al., 2010) . Quark is a family of cryptographic hash functions which is designed for extremely resourceconstrained environments like sensor networks and radiofrequency identification (RFID) tags. Like most one-way hash functions, Quark can be used as a pseudo-random function (PRF), a message authentication code (MAC), a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), a key derivation function, etc. Quark is shown to be much efficient hash function than SHA-1. However, in this paper, we use SHA-2 as the secure one-way hash function in order to achieve top security. We may use only 160-bits from the hash digest output of SHA-2.
Polynomial evaluation in GF(q)
Given a polynomial f(x) of degree t, where f(x) = a t x t + a tÀ1 x tÀ1 + Á Á Á + a 1 t + a 0 2 GF(q)[x] whose coefficients a i 's are from the finite field, Galois field GF(q),q being a prime. By applying Horner's rule (Cormen et al., 2010) , we require t modular multiplications and t modular additions in order to find the value of f(x) at a point x = x 0 .
In a special case, if f(x) is of the form fðxÞ
where a i 's and b are from GF(q), then to find the value of b, we need any one of the values a i 's. Using that a i , we can find b by b = f(a i ) (mod q), for some i.
Computational problems
In this section, we describe two computational problems: Discrete Exponentiation Problem (DEP) and Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).
Discrete exponentiation problem (DEP)
Given a multiplicative group G and an element g 2 G having order n. Then, compute y = g x modn, for any given x. This problem is computationally easy/feasible even if n is large. This modular exponentiation can be done efficiently by using the repeated square-and-multiply algorithm with time complexity O((log 2 n) 3 ) (Delfs and Knebl, 2007) .
Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
Given an element g in a finite group G whose order is n, that is, n = #G g (G g is the subgroup of G generated by g) and another element y in G g , find the smallest non-negative integer x such that g x = y. It is relatively easy to calculate discrete exponentiation g x (mod n) given g, x and n, but it is computationally infeasible to determine x given y, g and n, when n is large.
The proposed hierarchical-based proxy signature scheme
In this section, we first list the notations to be used in our scheme. We then discuss the different phases of our scheme.
Notations
We use the notations listed in Table 1 for describing our proposed proxy signature scheme.
Different phases
Our scheme contains six phases: setup phase, delegation phase, proxy signature generation phase, proxy signature verification phase, and phases for addition of new security classes in the hierarchy and removal of existing security classes from the hierarchy.
Setup phase
In this phase, the system parameters for the original signer are selected. The central certification authority (CA) then chooses the system parameters for each security class in the hierarchy. This phase consists of the following steps:
Step 1. CA selects large primes p and q such that p À 1 is perfectly divisible by q, that is, q OEp À 1.
Step 2. CA then selects a generator
Step 3. Consider a user hierarchy where there are n security classes SC 1 , SC 2 , . . . , SC n in the hierarchy with partially ordered relation 6 defined on it. The CA then generates n generators g 1 ; g 2 ; . . . ; g n 2 Z Ã q for n security classes in the user hierarchy, where
Step 4. CA generates randomly the full secret key sk i 2 Z Ã q and partial secret key s i 2 Z Ã q for each security class SC i in the user hierarchy.
Step 5. CA then calculates the public polynomial F j (x) for each security class SC j in the hierarchy as F j ðxÞ ¼ Q SCi>SCj ðx À g si j Þ þ sk j ðmod qÞ as in Chung et al. (2008) .
Step 6. CA sends (sk i ,s i ) to each security class SC i in the hierarchy via a secure channel.
Step 7. CA also sends the public polynomial F i (x), q and g i to each security class SC i via a public channel. CA finally makes p, q, g, g j 's, F j (x)'s and the hash function H(AE) as public.
An example. Consider again the user hierarchy shown in Fig. 1 . The public polynomials for the security classes constructed in Step 5 are as follows:
Þþsk 1 ðmod qÞ; where s 0 is given by CA
.2. Delegation phase
In order to delegate the signing capability to a proxy signer, the original signer A executes the following steps:
Step 1. The original signer A selects a random or pseudorandom integer X A (1 < X A < p À 1) and computes a public key
Step 2. A selects a random or pseudorandom integer k 2 Z Ã q and computes r = g k (mod p).
Step 3. Suppose the documents to be signed belonging to a security class in the hierarchy is known to the original signer A. However, as pointed out earlier in this paper that the original signer A is not any user of any security classes in the user hierarchy and the user hierarchy consists of only the security classes of proxy signers. A then selects a set P of designated proxy signers who are the users in security classes of the hierarchy. Since the document class is known to the original signer A, so the set P is also known to the original signer A. A can choose a user in a security class from P for which the user is available during that time period and also that user is not overloaded with other works. Let the proxy signer be a user in a security class SC i 2 P and we call that user as the proxy signer, B in our scheme. For example, in Fig. 1 , if the documents of SC 5 need to be signed, then A can select any one of the users in SC 1 , SC 3 and SC 5 as a proxy signer.
Step 4. A then calculates s = X A r + k M w (mod q), where M w is a warrant message which includes the identities of the original signer and the proxy signer, and also an expiration date.
Step 5. The original signer A selects a proxy signer B from the set P of designated proxy signers and sends the message AEr, s, M w ae to B via a secure channel.
Proxy signature generation phase
In order to generate signature on documents belonging to a security class SC c 2 P, the proxy signer B who is a user in security class SC i 2 P (SC c 6 SC i ) proceeds with the following steps:
Step 1. On receiving the tuple (r, s, M w ) from the original signer A, the proxy signer B verifies whether g s ¼ r Mw Y r A ðmod pÞ holds or not. If it holds, B accepts the tuple (r, s, M w ) as a valid tuple. Note that
Step 2. In order to compute the secret key sk c of the security class SC c , B first computes u ¼ g si c ðmod qÞ using the public generator g c of SC c and its own class SC i 's partial secret key s i . B then computes the full secret key sk c as sk c ¼ F c ðuÞ ðmod qÞ ¼ F c g si c ðmod qÞ À Á ðmod qÞ by evaluating the public polynomial F c (x) of the security class SC c at the point u.
Step 3. B selects a random or pseudorandom integer X B (1 < X B < q À 1) and computes a public key
Step 4. Let M be the message (document of SC c ) to be signed by B. B computes H(MiM w isk c is i ), s 0 = s + H(MiM w isk c is i )X B (mod q) and t ¼ g s 0 ðmod pÞ.
Step 5. B then computes the hash value H(MiM w it).
The proxy signature on the message M is considered as the tuple (M, M w , H(MiM w isk c is i ), r, H(Mi M w it)). Step 6. B finally sends the message AEM, M w , H(Mi M w isk c is i ), r, H(MiM w it)ae to the verifier or receiver V via a public channel.
Proxy signature verification phase
In order to verify the proxy signature on the message M, the verifier V does the following steps:
Step
ðmod pÞ, using the received r, H(MiM w isk c is i ), M w , and the public keys Y A and Y B .
Step 2. V then computes the hash value H(MiM w i t 0 ) using the computed value of t 0 and the received message M.
Step 3. Finally, V verifies whether the computed hash value H(MiM w it 0 ) matches with the received hash value H(M iM w it). If there is a match, V accepts B's signature as a valid signature; otherwise, V rejects the signature of B.
We have summarized the delegation, proxy signature generation and proxy signature verification phases of our scheme in Table 2 .
Addition of new security classes in hierarchy
Some times we require to add/remove security classes into the hierarchy. Therefore, dynamic access control must be provided. In this phase, we show how a new security class can be added to the hierarchy. Suppose a new security class SC k will be inserted into the hierarchy such that SC i P SC k P SC j . CA renews the secret keys sk j of successors SC j of the newly added security class SC k . CA also changes the public polynomial F j (x) with F 0 j ðxÞ of SC j . CA needs the following steps:
Step 1: CA updates the partial relationships that follow when the security class SC k joins the hierarchy.
Step 2: CA selects the full secret key sk k 2 Z Ã q , the partial secret key s k 2 Z Ã q randomly and generator g k 2 Z Ã q for SC k .
Step 3: For all SC i that satisfies the relationship SC i P SC k when the new class SC k is inserted in the hierarchy, CA computes g si k ðmod qÞ.
Step 4: CA then computes the public polynomial F k (x) for SC k as F k ðxÞ ¼
Þþ sk k ðmod qÞ
Step 5: For all SC i such that SC i P SC k and for all SC j such that SC i P SC k P SC j when the new class SC k is inserted in the hierarchy, CA replaces the secret key sk j with sk 0 j and computes the updated public polynomial F 0 j ðxÞ as F 0 j ðxÞ ¼ Q SCi>SC k >SCj x À g si j À Á
x À g s k j À Á þ sk 0 j ðmod qÞ.
Step 6: Finally, CA replaces F j (x) with F 0 j ðxÞ, and sends sk 0 j to SC j via a secure channel, and announces publicly F 0 j ðxÞ. CA also sends sk k and s k to SC k via a secure channel, and announces publicly F k (x).
Note that in order to resist the exterior root finding attack, we have replaced sk j by sk 0 j in the updated polynomial F 0 j ðxÞ for SC j .
An example. Consider the user hierarchy shown in Fig. 2 , in which the new security class SC 6 is added to the existing hierarchy shown in Fig. 1 . Then, the public polynomials for the security classes will be as follows:
Þþsk 1 ðmod qÞ; where s 0 is given by CA This phase remains similar to that as in Chung et al. (2008) . Now, if an existing security class SC k , such that the relationship SC i P SC k P SC j breaks up, wants to leave from a user hierarchy, CA not only directly revokes information related to SC k , but also it needs to alter the accessing relationship be- tween the involved ex-predecessor SC i and ex-successor SC j of SC k . CA requires the following steps for this purpose.
Step 1: CA needs to update the partial relationship that follows when SC k is removed.
Step 2: For all SC k such that the relationship SC k P SC j holds, CA renews the secret key sk j as sk 0 j and the generator g j as g 0 j of SC j . Then, for all SC i such that the relationship SC i P SC j holds, CA renews the relationship SC i P SC j after removing SC k , computes the public polynomial F 0 j ðxÞ as F 0 j ðxÞ ¼ Q SCi>SCj ðx À g 0si j Þ þ sk 0 j ðmod qÞ and replaces F j (x) with F 0 j ðxÞ.
Step 3: CA finally sends sk 0 j to SC j via a secret channel and announces g 0 j and F 0 j ðxÞ as public.
Analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we first show the correctness of our proposed scheme. We then analyze the computational overhead required for our scheme. Finally, we show that our scheme can tolerate different security attacks. ðmod pÞ ¼ t 0 :
Correctness of the proposed scheme
Hence, the theorem is proved. h
Computational overhead
For analyzing the computational costs, we use the notations described in Table 3 .
From the delegation phase described in Section 3.2.2, it is clear that the original signer requires the computational complexity 2t exp + 2t mul + t add during this phase. The proxy signature generation phase described in Section 3.2.3 requires the computational complexity 6t exp + t poly + t add + 2tmul + 2t h , whereas the proxy signature verification phase described in Section 3.2.4 requires the computational complexity 3t exp + 2t mul + t h .
Security analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme satisfies all the security requirements of a proxy signature. The security requirements are discussed in the following subsections.
Unforgeability
Let an original signer being an attacker try to forge a proxy signature on any arbitrary message M 0 . Suppose the attacker chooses M 0 ; M 0 w ; H M 0 kM 0 w ksk c ks i À Á 0 and tries to find s 0 such that t ¼ g s 0 ðmod pÞ, where s 0 = s + H(MiM w i sk c is i )X B (mod q). The attacker knows the values M, M w , p, q, s, Y A and Y B . It is noted that the original signer, who is an attacker in this case, is not any user of the hierarchy. Therefore, to retrieve sk c of the document class SC c of the hierarchy, the attacker needs to know the partial secret keys s i of designated proxy signers' security classes. But then computing the secret key sk c of the document class SC c of the hierarchy from the hash value H(MiM w isk c is i ) knowing M and M w is computationally infeasible due to one-way property of the hash function H(AE). Moreover, in order to compute s 0 the attacker needs to know the private key X B of the proxy signer B, which is again a computationally infeasible problem because X B is embedded with H(MiM w it) in s 0 . Also to determine directly X B from Y B ¼ g XB ðmod pÞ is a computationally infeasible problem due to the difficulty of solving DLP (discussed in Section 2). Hence, the attacker does not have any ability to recompute HðM 0 kM 0 w ktÞ and as a result, the attacker, who is the original signer, cannot forge a proxy signature.
Consider the case where the attacker is one of the users in the set P of designated signers chosen by the original signer A. Now, other security classes in the set P can also derive the secret key sk c of the document class SC c of the hierarchy if those security classes have higher security clearances than that for SC c . However, the original signer sends the delegation message AEr, s,M w ae to the proxy signer via a secure channel. As a result, the attacker does not have any ability to recreate a valid proxy signature on behalf of the delegated proxy signer B and he/she cannot forge a proxy signature.
Identifiability
Any verifier can easily determine the relationship of the delegation between the original signer and a proxy signer due to the following reason. In our scheme, in order to verify a proxy signature the verifier requires the verification condition H(MiM-
pÞ; s 0 ¼ s þ HðMkM w ksk c ks i ÞX B ðmod qÞ and t ¼ g s 0 ðmod pÞ. Recall that the warrant message M w contains the identities of the original signer and a proxy signer along with an expiration date. Thus, the verifier can determine whether the signature was generated by a proxy signer on behalf of the original signer or not.
Undeniability
In signature generation of our scheme, the proxy signer computes first s 0 = s + H(MiM w isk c is i )X B (mod q) and then t ¼ g s 0 ðmod pÞ. Thus, s 0 is computed using the private key X B and the partial secret key s i of the proxy signer and hence, t contains the private key X B and the partial secret key s i of that proxy signer. Due to usages of X B and s i in the proxy signature creation, the proxy signer has no way to deny later about this proxy signature creation by himself/herself on behalf of the original signer.
Verifiability
In the proxy signature generation phase of our scheme, after receiving the tuple (r, s, M w ) from the original signer A, the proxy signer B verifies the condition g s ¼ r Mw Y r A ðmod pÞ using the public key Y A of A, and other information such as g, s, r, M w and p. Thus, the proxy signer can verify the delegation power of the original signer, and as a result our proposed scheme is verifiable.
Distinguishability
From our proxy signature verification phase described in Section 3.2.4, we note that the verifier V needs to compute
ðmod pÞ and then to check the verification condition H(MiM w it 0 ) = H(MiM w it). Here t is generated by the proxy signer as t ¼ g s 0 ðmod pÞ; s 0 ¼ s þ HðMkM w ksk c ks i ÞX B ðmod qÞ, and r = g k (mod p) and s = X A r + k M w (mod q) are generated by the original signer. Thus, the verifier can distinguish the signature of the proxy signer from the normal signatures.
Secrecy
Note that during the delegation phase of our scheme, the original signer generates a private key X A (1 < X A < p À 1) and computes the public key Y A ¼ g X A ðmod pÞ. After that the original signer selects a random integer k 2 Z Ã q and computes the public value r = g k (mod p). Finally, the original signer computes s = X A r + k M w (mod q) and sends the message AEr, s, Mw ae to the proxy signer via a secure channel. Now, deriving k from r = g k (mod p) and X A from Y A ¼ g X A ð mod pÞ is computationally infeasible due to the difficulty of solving DLP. Consequently, deriving X A from s = X A r + k M w (mod q) becomes a computationally infeasible problem. Thus, the original signer's private key X A cannot be derived from any public information by an attacker, and as a result the secrecy property is also preserved by our scheme.
Simulation results for formal security analysis
In this section, we have implemented our scheme under the AVISPA model checkers for formal security analysis to verify whether there is any attack on our scheme or not. Cryptographic protocols are analyzed by the AVISPA tool and require to be specified in a language called HLPSL (High Level Protocol Specification Language), which is a role based language. In HLPSL, basic roles represent each participant's role, and the composition of roles for representing scenarios of basic roles. AVISPA supports four model checkers, called the back-ends. The On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) is a back-end which is responsible for performing several symbolic techniques to explore the state space in a demand-driven way. The CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher) is the second back-end which provides a translation from any security protocol specification written as transition relation in an intermediate format into a set of constraints which are effectively used to check whether there are possible attacks on protocols. Third back-end called the SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), and the fourth back-end called TA4SP (Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols) approximate the intruder knowledge by using the propositional formula and regular tree languages respectively. The backends produce the output in the following formats. The first printed section is called the SUMMARY which indicates whether the protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is inconclusive. The second section called DETAILS, which explains under what condition the protocol is declared safe, or what conditions have been used for finding an attack, or finally why the analysis was inconclusive. The other sections called PROTOCOL, GOAL and BACKEND are the name of the protocol, the goal of the analysis and the name of the backend used, respectively. After comments and statistics, the trace of the attack (if any) is finally displayed in the usual Alice-Bob notation. More details on AVISPA tool can be found in von Oheimb (2005) and Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (2011). Fig. 3 shows the specification in HLPSL language for the role of the initiator, the original signer A. A sends the message AE r, s, M w ae to proxy signer B via a secure channel, who is a user in the security class SC i in the set P. Fig. 4 shows the specification in HLPSL language for the role of the proxy signer B. After receiving the message AEr, s, M w ae from A, it sends the message AEM, M w , H(MiM w isk c i s i ), r, H(MiM w it)ae to the verifier or receiver V via a public channel.
In Fig. 5 , we have implemented the role of the verifier, V in HLPSL. The verifier receives the message AEM, M w , H(MiM w isk c is i ), r, H(MiM w it)ae from B via a public channel.
We assume that the intruder has knowledge of all public parameters. We have simulated our scheme using the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA (SPAN). The results are tested using OFMC, CL-AtSe and SATMC backends. The results of the analysis using OFMC, CL-AtSe and SATMC of our scheme are shown in Figs. 6-8. The summary of simulation results are as follows:
OFMC reports the protocol is safe. CL-AtSe reports the protocol is safe. SATMC reports the protocol is safe.
From the detailed results of simulation, it is found that there are no possible passive and active attacks on our scheme.
Performance comparison with related schemes
In this section, we compare the performance and security of our scheme with other related schemes. To best of our knowledge, Giri et al.'s proxy signature scheme is only based on the hierarchical access control so far in the literature. For this reason, we thus compare the performance of our scheme with Giri et al.'s scheme only. For comparing the computational costs between Giri et al.'s scheme and our scheme, we have used the same notations described in Table 3 . Performance comparison in terms of computational complexity between our scheme and Giri et al.'s scheme is shown in Table 4 . Note that Giri et al.'s scheme requires more computational time during the delegation and proxy signature verification phases as compared to those for our scheme. However, our scheme requires more computational complexity during the proxy signature generation phase as compared to that for Giri et al.'s scheme. Overall, our scheme is comparable with Giri et al.'s scheme from the computational complexity point of view.
In Table 5 , we have shown the functionality comparison between our scheme and Giri et al.'s scheme. In this table, we have used the following notations. I 1 : Whether satisfies unforgeability security requirement or not; I 2 : Whether satisfies identifiability security requirement or not; I 3 : Whether satisfies undeniability security requirement or not; I 4 : Whether satisfies verifiability security requirement or not; I 5 : Whether satisfies distinguishability security requirement or not; I 6 : Whether satisfies secrecy security requirement or not; I 7 : Whether flexible in choosing the proxy signer or not. We note that our scheme is secure against the possible attacks which are demonstrated through the analytical and simulation results discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5, respectively. In addition, our scheme has the flexibility in choosing the proxy signers from a designated set of proxy signers based on their availability and work load, whereas Giri et al.'s scheme does not have that criteria.
Conclusion
We have proposed a new proxy signature scheme based on hierarchical access control. In our scheme the documents of a user belonging to a security class in the hierarchy can be signed by a proxy signer who is either that user or any user belonging to some security class in a set of designated proxy signers selected by the original signer. Our scheme satisfies all the security requirements needed by a proxy signature. The proposed scheme is also efficient in terms of computational complexity as compared with the existing related proxy signature schemes. In addition, dynamic access control such as addition of new security classes into the hierarchy and removal of existing security classes from the hierarchy is supported efficiently.
